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MICROECONOMICS
STOCHASTIC MODELS OF PRICE ADJUSTMENT*
BY STEVEN BARTA AND PRAVIN VARAIVA
Sonic models of stochastic approximation ace presented which seek to explain how several sellers in a
single market adjust their prices and quantities in disequilibrium and when the demand for their product is
imperfectly known. These adjustment schemes have the known property that they permit sellers to
simultaneously learn their demand function more accurate1v and to search for more satisfactory price
levels wit/i little computation. Sonic subtle effects of stochastic environments are discovered which have
escaped informal discussions of the problem.
1. INTRODtJCI1ON
Several authors seeking to explain how sellers set prices or quantities outside
of equilibrium simplify their analysis by "avoid[ing] the problem of what firms
should do when they do not know their demand functions" [4, p. 186]. The
simplification is achieved by assuming either that sellers know very little or ignore
their monopoly power [2, 8], or that sellers know their demand functions exactly
[1, 3]. These assumptions are made in spite of the fact that in discussing their
models these authors often argue in terms of the uncertainty in demand.
When there is uncertainty about its demand function, the firm can experi-
ment with its prices and observe the reactions of its customers, and with this
additional information the firm may discover levels of profitable prices. The
problem of finding the optimal sequence of prices can be posed as a problem in
Bayesian decision theory, and this has been done for the case of a single firm in a
very simple economic environment [4]. Such a formulation has twodeficiencies.
First, the computational effort necessary to calculate the optimal sequence is so
great that even its normative significance is diminished if costs of computation are
taken into account. Secondly, any attempt to extend along these directions the
formulation to include several interacting firms appear to lead inevitably into the
considerably more intractable theory of sequenial stochastic games. (For some
recent efforts in this area see [9, 10].)
It is the objective of this article to present .i family of price-adjustment
processes for firms in a single market which (a) are ro'iust as well as computation-
ally simple, (b) exhibit the Tact that firms must experiment to discover profitable
prices, and (c) possess orthodox convergence properties. From the viewpoint of
economic theory it is interesting to note here that the convergence of these
processes is determined largely by the convergence of correspondingrules (such
as those studied in [1, 2, 31]) where the firms know their demand functionsin
advance. This is because the processes presented here converge if (I) the behavior
of consumers is systematic enough even while it is random so that each firm can
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learn, through repeated trials, the demand for its productat any setof fixedprices,
and if (ii) assuming the firms know their demand functions, theadjustment
processes lead to prices which converge to an equilibrium. Since condition (ii) has
already been well investigated in the economics literature,our main task is to
investigate condition (i). Aswe shall see this condition captures certain subtle
phenomena which elude informal discussions ofprice adjustment under uncer-
tainty. As an example,we may mention here that prices can stabilize to an excess
supply situation simply because firmsreact faster to excess demand than to excess
supply.
From the mathematical viewpoint theproposed rules belong to the family
known as "stochastic approximation"schemes following the pioneeringpaper of
Robbiris and Monro [7]. However,we shall follow the formulation due to Ljung [ii]notonly because it is considerablymore general in several respects but also
because it clearly pointsout the dual functions of learning and searchmentioned
above. Motivated by thesame concerns as those mentioned above, Aoki{12,13]
has already used stochasticapproximation methods to modelsome adjustment
processes. The relation between his work andthat presented here will be detailed
in Section 4.
In the next sectionwe state the main results of[1 1] in the form ofan abstract
adjustment model. In Section 3this model is used to investigatestochastic
versions of the more concreteprocesses proposed in [1, 2, 3].
2. ANABSTRACT ADJUSTMENT MODEL
Nfirms produce and sella homogeneous product. At the endof period t firm nsets certain instrumental variables(e.g. prices or quantities)denoted by the vectorv.It is assumed thatt;belongs to an a priori fixed,compact setB.Let B=B 1x...xB".Letv= (v,...,v)be the distribution ofthese variables across the market. (In the followingwhenever a superscript isomitted from a variable name, it designatesthe vector whosecomponents correspond to the various firms; thusy =(y1,...,y") etc.) in periodt+ 1 consumers searchamong firms and react to thedistributionv.Their behavior asobserved by the nth firm is formulated by it as thevector y'(v, where {j is a randomvector sequence defined on theprobability space (Q,P).Note that yis determined by the action of all firmsv,and the random variable which does not dependonv,. Based on this observationthe firm adjusts itsinstruments at the end ofperiod r+ 1 according to the rule
(2.1) (w) = {v'(w)+ yH(y'(v,(), (w)))]B
=[Vo)+ y,z(v,(),e,+i(w))]
Here Yt >0 is aconstant determining speedof adjustment,H"( )is a function which relatesan observation to desirabledirections of changein the variable u",z(v,4) =H(y(v, i)),and [ jB is any functionsatisfying
[x]8 EBforallx,[x] for XEB.
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supposed to be transitory. That is, if consumers face a constant distribution v then
their average behavior stabilizes, i.e.. there is a function Z(v) so that
Jim Z1(v)= Z(v)for eachv E B.
Thus the environment is "stationary" in an important sense.
Next, it is assumed that as a result of firms seeking their goals, or as a hidden
"aim" of market forces, the instrumental variables are directed to the v'' defined
by the "equilibrium" condition
Z(v*)=Oi.e.Zfl(v*)=O,n=1,...,N.
If each firm n could directly observe Z" (v) then v would be an equilibrium of the
differential equation
(2.2) v=Z(v).
On the other hand, for any fixed a, Z(v) can be estimated by
(2.3) '(v, w)=+ y,[z(v, ,(w)) w)J,=0.
(For example, if Yt=t1,then (2.3) yields=f (v, which is a robust
estimator.) Thus the actual adjustment rule (2.1) can be seen as a way of
combining simultaneously the "learning" process (2.3) and the equilibrium-
seeking process (2.2).
We impose the following conditions.
(Cl) O)y1,y-Oast-+D,y=o.
(C2a)For each fixedVEB,the random sequence {(v)} generated by (2.3)
converges to Z(v) a.s.
(C2b)For each fixed, the function z,(v,) is uniformly Lipschitz in v belonging
to an open set B° D B, with Lipschitz constant k,(). Furthermore, the random
sequence {r} generated by
= r,(co) + y[k,(1(w)) r,(w)], r0 =0,
converges to a constant r a.s.
(C3a)The set B is defined by B={v113(v)b} for some constant b where fJ is a
twice continuously differentiable function, and there is a constant k so that
E[(z(v, k
for allt,and a, u in B. Here f3,,.,(u) is the Hessian of J3 evaluated atU.
(C3b)For all vEB, the boundary of B,
((v))'Z(v) <0.
(C3c)v'' is an asymptotically stable equilibrium of the differential equation
(2.2), and its domain of attraction contains an open set B° B.
We discuss these conditions after stating the main result.
T2.l. Consider the random sequence {v} generated by (2.1). Suppose (C1)(C3)
hold. Then v converges to a" a.s.
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Proof The assertion isan immediateconsequenceof Theorem 3.!, Theorem 5.2
and the subsequent remark in {1i}.
Consider the conditions in reverse order. (C3c)says thatifZ(v) were directly
observable then all solutions of (2.2) whichstart in B converge to v. Since this
case is well-studied in the literature, it need not detainus further. Since (C3b) is
only slightly stronger than thestatement that B is an invariant set of (2.2), it is
usually satisfied whenever (C3c) is. (C3a)guarantees that the effect of the
disturbances {,} is not too large. For instance,it is easily verified if z(v,) is
Continuous in (v,) uniformly iniand sup EJ <co.
(C2a) guarantees that it is possibleto estimate Z(v) for any fixed v while
(C2b) guarantees that estimates(v) converges to Z(v) uniformly fort'EB, and
this implies in particular that Z(v)is a Lipschitz function so that the differential
equation (2.2) is well-behaved.
The requirement y,>Oreflects the fact that in (2.1)zis a direction of
desirable change in v', whereasthe boundYr1 is merely a normalizing condition
in light of the second conditiony, - 0. This latter condition is necessary if learning
behavior is to be exhibited sincethen as time progressesnew observations should have decreasing importance.The condition is discussedmore fully in the next section in the context ofa specific example. The divergence ofy, is obviously essential.
The interesting conditionstherefore are (C2a) and (C3c).Roughly speaking, the formerguarantees that learning is possible inprinciple, while the latter
guarantees convergence in the absenceof uncertainty. The remainingconditions link these in sucha way as to ensure that both functionstan be carried out simultaneously.
We conclude this sectionby giving some simpleconditions which guarantee (C2a) and (C2b).
L2.1. Supposesatisfies (2.4) andy satisfies (Cl) and (2.5).
(2.4) are independent iftsIM for some M<co
(2.5) and
11 for eath v in B thereexists a> I such that
(2.6) EIz,(v, (fl)-Z1(U)58'
for some nondecreasingsequence 8, and
(2.7) y6<co, where=min(a, l+a),
then (C2a) holds.
If Ek,(1)=r, converges to r, and ifthere existsa >1such that
(2.8)
for 8, nondecrcasingand (2.7) is satisfied,then (C2b) holds.Furthermore, if I <a2, then (2.5) isnot needed.
270Proof. See Appendix A. 1.
Consider (2.4). Notc thatthe disturbance term is aconsequence of consumer
search. If periods remote in the past do not affect their search and hence their
behavior in the present period, or if their behavior varies independently between
distant periods, or is a new "generation" of consumers replaces the previous
generation every so often; in all such environments (2.4) may be reasonable.' (2.5)





Yr)'r-IU yr).Thus (2.5) means that in the estimate'(v) recent observations
are weighted more heavily than previous observations. Condition (2.7) is more
interesting since it exhibits a trade-off between the efficiency of search and
learning. Specifically, the slower y, converges to zero the greater is the effect of
disturbances on the learning process, but the faster is the convergence of v, to vif
it converges at all, and (2.7) displays this conflict in the two functions.
3. SOME CONCRETE ADJUSTMENT PROCESSES
In this section we follow the abstract mode introduced above to obtain
stochastic versions of some adjustment processes studied in the literature.
3.1 Fisher's Quasi-competitive Adjustment
For a discussion of this model the reader should consult [2]. At the end of
period t, firm n (n=1,. . ., N), believing that it faces a flat demand curve, sets a
price p' and offers for sale the amount S(p'). p B'=[b, b]c R+, and S"(p") is
just the inverse of the marginal cost curve.
In period H- 1 consumers search among various firms and register the
demand d"(p,,4i) at firm n. {} is a stationary sequence of random vectors. Let
x"(p,, = d(p,,+i) - S"(p) be the excess demand of firm n at end of period
t+ 1. For each p fixed let D(p)=E[d(p, c,)], and let X"(p)=D(p) - S(p). At
the end of period t4-1 the firm adjusts its price according to the rule
n ri,lfl B
(3.1) p,+1=[p,+y,h x (pj,4,)]
where h" >0 is constant.
Assume thatis bounded a.s. Let B° B be an open set such that for fixed
U, f(p, ) is Lipschitz in p E B° with constant k(U) and
(3.2) k()is bounded a.s.
Assume further that for each fixed p
(3.3) x"(p,,) is bounded a.s.
as seen from [111, (2.4) can be replaced by weaker conditions which imply thatvand
become independent ast -*cO.
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Iersw.*,tTFinally, assume thatp EBis a unique, globally stable equilibrium of the
differential cquation
(3.4)
with a dornainof attraction containing B°, andthat
(3.5) X"(p)>O ifp'b;X(p)<O fp"/.
T3.1. Suppose the assumptions madeabove hold. SupposeYt satisfies (C1),(25)
and for some a> 1
(3.6) yzco.
Suppose,, are independent for 11-sIM. Then the random-sequence {p,}
generated by (2. 1) convergesto p" a.s.
Proof.Because of T2. I we only needto verify conditions (i), (ii) of L2. 1. Because
of (3.2), (3.3) and (3.6) theseconditions hold for 8constant.
Since Fisher has extensivelydiscussed the stability of (3.4),we need not
consider it any further. (3.5) isreasonable in the partial equilibriumcontext of the model. Hence we shall onlydeal with the stochasticaspects of (3.1).
At first sight the stationarybut myopic adjustmentprocess
(3.7) - p'+h"f (Pt,
may appear more plausible than (3.1).Similar schemes have beenstudied for example in [6] and[151.2However (3.7) is incompatiblewith learning in thesense that if the firm knows it facesrandomly fluctuating demandand if its intention is to discover constant levelsof price and productionwhich are compatible with average conditions of demand,then this intentioncannot be realized through (3.7). For suppose forsimplicity that N=1, S(p)=s0 + sp, d(p,)=d0 - dp + andare independent with zeromean. Suppose further that h isso small that I1h(s+d)I<1 Then Ep-pand E[ptEp,J2-o2 whereso+s= d0+d15 and h2{1- h (s + d)J2 E> U ifEE>O.Thus, while the statisticalaverage of the excess demand tends to vanish,actual prices andproduction levels fluctuate constantly with thedemand.3On the other hand, ifthe firm is aimingto meet average demand then, as it gainsinformation about thisaverage demand, it must respond less and less toinstantaneous fluctuations.This accounts for'y, -*0. A similar phenomenonoccurs in [4] where the firmeventually stops adjustingits price even though demandcontinues to changerandomly. Instead of prices adjustingin proportion toexcess demand, we couldconsider
(3.8) P+ip'+y,H[x"(p
where H is a signpreservjngfunction. Suppose H'has at most lineargrowth. Then Pr -i a.s. where EH[X" (fl,)]0 so that j3may not equal thecompetitive
2Ourinformation regarding [15]is limited to the discussionin [5]. 3lncidentally, atime-continuous version of thisexampleshows that Theorem3.3 of [61 is incorrect.
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n-1, H(x)=ax ifx'>O, H(x)=x if x<0. Thenis determined by
EH[x(j5)+,]0 or aE[x()+J"=E[x(f)+z]where f=[V0 and f=
(f)VO. It follows that if a> 1, i.e., the firm reactsfaster to positive excess
demand, then X() <0 so that at the equilibriumprice there is positive excess
supply. Furthermore, the greater is the randomness indemand, the larger will be
the value of X(,3)I. For instance, ifis uniformly distributed over [a, a], then
X()=(1 + a)(a - a)1a. Thus if we interpret the sellers asworkers supplying
labor and if wages rise faster in conditions of excessdemand than they fall in
situations of unemployment, then wages will converge to anequilibrium where
there is unemployment. Of course, the oppositetendency prevails if a < 1.
One final remark in connection with nonlinearfunctions H" may he of
interest. Under the conditions on X(p) in ji2],p* is the competitive equilibrium
and so, in particular, all of its components p"are equal. 'I'he equilibriumis given
by EH"[X"(j3)-F-.]=On=1,. .., N. Even under the same conditions as in [2],it
is, of course, no more generally the case thatall the 5" are equal. A similar
conclusion is reached in [4, p. 201] except that thesedifferences in adjustment
processes arise from different beliefsabout the structure of the random demand.
3.2 Diamond's Adjustment Model
The reader should consult [1] for the modeldiscussed here. Again there are
several firms. In each period consumers searchrandomly among these firms hut
they do not discriminate between them on thebasis of previous experience.
Therefore each firm faces demand functions whosestatistical properties are
identical and so we need consider one firm only. A consumerwho entered the
market at some time 'rt stays in the market until he encounters aprice Pt which
exceeds his own cutoff price q. He then purchasesthe amount d(p1,+i).The
cutoff price q depends in some random way uponprevious prices pr,. .., P-IIn
keeping with the spirit of the search process asdescribed in [1], it is assumed here
that {} is a sequence of stationary, independentrandom vectors.
Let N(p) be the (random) number of consumerswho entered the market atT,
who are still in the market at t. and whose cutoff priceexceeds p. Then the demand
function facing our firm in period tisTtd(p,+1)N(p). The firm's unit
production cost is constant, and we may assume it is zero, sothat its profit function
is pd(p, 1)N(p) where N(p)=N(p).
Let r(p, =pd(p, and R(p)=Er(p, for each fixed p. Let p, E
B =[b, b]c R+ be the price set by the firm atthe end of periodr.Then in period
t+ lit observesp) and '(Pt, 1+1)N(p) so that it knowsr( p1,
Suppose for the moment that the firm wishes to setits price at a levelp5at
which R (p5) equals some 'satisficing" level RY Then if p is adjusted according to
the rule
(3.9) P1+1=[p1+y,(R5r(p1,+1))f
4We do not discuss the role of N,( p) any further since under the assumptions onthe adjustments
of the cutoff price given in [1], N,(p,)-+ N, the total(fixed) number of customers in the market,
whenever Pi converges
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it will converge to pSas.underappropriate conditions which can he obtained
from the results of the previous section.
Now suppose the firm wishes to maximize R(p).Then if the maximum value
of the profit is not known,a rule such as (3.9) is clearly inappropriate. In essence.
the firm needs to obtain informationfrom which it can infer whether or not it has
reached a profit-maximizing position,and if it has not done so which directionof
change would lead toan increase in profits. Such information is provided bythe
marginal revenue function M(p)(dR/dp)(p). Suppose momentarily thatat eachrthe firm can obtaina sampleni,(n,i) where {'i,} is a random sequenceso that, for each fixedp, Ern,(p, ) =M,( p)-*M(p) as t - cx. Then prices adjusted
according to
(3.10) Pii '{p,+y,'n,(p,,q,1)J'1
would, under appropriateconditions, converge to p at which M(p*)=0. The sample rn,(p,, may be obtained directly iii someway not explicitly
considered in the model,or it can be obtained by experimentationin the following way. Suppose each periodt Consists of two subperiods labeled (t,1) and (1, 2). Suppose at the end ofperiod (t, 1), the firm's price isPt,i and in period (t. 2) it observes r(p,1,2).At the end of period (, 2),it sets the priceP1.2 =Pi.i -Q,where a,>0 is a predeterminedsequence to be specified further. Inperiod (t+ 1, 1) the firm observesr(piia,, i)Define
(3.11) m1(p4I,iI)=!{r(pI,2)_T(p1a
whereTh+i= (, Suppose now thatPt+t,i is adjusted according to
(3.12) P,i.i[p,.i+y,rn,(p,1, m+)]8
in a way quite similarto (3.10).
We can use 12.1 and L2.I to obtain sets ofconditions under anyone of which the sequenceP,i generated by Diamond'sprocess (3.12) converges to the profit-maximizing price. Hereis one such resultwhose proofcan be readily constructed using 12.1 and L2.1.
T3.2. Let B° B bean open set such that
M(b) >0, M(b) <0,M is monotonicon B°, E[r(p,)_r(p)J2o.2<cfor PE B°,
r(p,) is twice continuouslydifferentiable inp for fixedand
far dRl2 Ej_(p,)__jso-;<ctfor iB°
(iv) y,-0,a,-0,




Note that (iv') is considerably weaker than (iv) because since a, -0 a sequence {y,}
satisfying (iv) must decrease much faster than if it had to satisfy (iv'). In turn this
means that convergence of p, under (iv) is considerablyslower than under (iv').
This is a reflection of the fact that obtaining an estimate of the marginal revenue
function M(p) from observations of random demand is a subtle process since Mis
not given in parametric form. Of course, if it were parametrized, say,it is known to
be a linear function with unknown slope and intercept, then faster convergenceis
possible.
3.3 Adjustment to a Nash Equilibrium
For discussion of the model introduced here see [31. In a certain sense thisis
an extension of Diamond's model discussedearlier. Consumer search behavior
causes the demand faced by a firm to depend uponthe other firms' prices. Each
firm realizes that it faces a sloping demand curve, and its objective is to exploit this
monopoly power.
If p E B"=[h, b] c R is the price set by firm n at the end of period t, then the
demand for its product during period I + 1 is d" (p,,) where p,=(p,'.....p) is
the distribution of prices among the N firms and {,} is a stationaryrandom
sequence. Let D"(p)=Ed"(p,). C(q") is thc cost function of firm n. We
assume that D" and C" are twice continuouslydifferentiable. Define the profit
function"(p)=p"D"(p)C"[D"(p)]. We assume with Fisher [3, p. 449] that
for fixed values of p'. i
(3.13) ir"(p) is strictly concave in p" E B".
It follows from a result due to Rosen [14] that there exists a Nash equilibriumprice
vector pEB, i.e.,
n-ì n -N ti- n ii .ir(p,...,p,...,p )i(p) forp EB,fl1.....
Next we assume (see [3, Theorem 3.1]) that
(3.14) is the unique Nash equilibrium in B
and for each u
(3.15) -(p)>Oifp" =b,,(p)<OifP=
which is reasonable and self-explanatory.
Fisher assumes the existence of the NashequiIibrunì when in fact it is a consequenceof the
concavity assumption.
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Now, for each p= (p',..,p')a B, let p'= p"(p) EB be the price at which
firm n maximizes prolit when all theother firms' prices are fixed at p',i i.e.,
71iL(pI,...,j5'l.........ir"(p',p,..,
J)N)forj3" a B".
Equivalently, in view of (3.15),'is determined by
air'. -'i N
p)=O.
Fisher imposes enough additionalconditions to guarantee that the adjust-
ment rule
(3.17) "=
where H" is any sign-preservingfunction, has an asymptotically, globallystable
equilibrium j3 (see [3, Theorem 3.2]). Nowfor (3.17) to be a good description ofan
adjustment process, it presupposes thateach firm n has an accurate knowledgeof its profit function ir"(p),so that it could solve for p7" from (3.16). If, however,it
does not have this knowledge, thefirm can still attempt to estimate air"/ap'from the observed random demandd"(p1,+i)and its own cost function,as was proposed in regard to the Diamondmodel. For simplicity weassume that the firm
has directly available to it theobservation rn"(p,, q11) such that
(3.18) Ein"(p, m)=,(p) foreach fixed paB,
and it uses this observationto adjust p" according to therule
(3.19) p+ip+rn'1(p, m+).
We can prove the followingconvergence result.
T3.3. Assume that (3.14), (3.15)hold and that j3 is theunique asymptotically, globally stable equilibriumof (3.17) (for any sign-preservingH") with domain of attraction containing B. Assumethat {m} is a bounded,stationary process with m independent when jtsJ T forsome T<OD, Let {'y,} bea sequence satisfying
(3.20) O')l,y,-*Oast-J,)+iy,(l1), <
for some a> I. Then the random sequence {pt} generated by (3.19)converges a.s, to 5.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
From our earliest discussionit is clear that if insteadof (3.19) we consider the more general rule
P*-Ip'+y,H"[in"(p,m+)]
we still get convergence to j5 ifH(x)=hx for h" a positiveConstant, whereas, if H is a nonlinear sign-preservingfunction then theprocess is likely toConverge to a different equilibrium, Oneadditional remark whichconcerns the Fisher adjust- Inent process (3.17) may bc ofinterest. In the proofof T3.3 we showthat the
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(3.16)stability of (3.17) and the concavity assumption (3.13) together imply thatthe
trajectories of
(3.21)
converge to. Now,from relatively abstract mathematical considerations (see
[16]), we know that Nash equilibria are unlikely to be stable equilibria of systems
with gradient dynamics as in (3.21). This consideration provides an argument(in
addition to those made by Fisher himself) that the assumptions which guarantee
stability of (3.17) are very restrictive.
4. CociusioNs AND NUMERICAL RESULJS
We have tried to show how disequilibrium adjustment processeswhich
consider only "deterministic" environments can be modeled as stochastic approx-
imation schemes so as to take into account uncertainties on the part of sellers. In
doing so we have discovered a variety of subtle phenomena which haveescaped
informal discussions of the subject.
Aoki appears to be the first to have used stochastic approximation methods to
model adjustment processes and he has been motivated by the same concerns.In
[121 he has compared a RobbinsMonro scheme with threeBayesian formula-
tions, all for a single firm whose demand function depends only onits own price,
and shows that they are asymptotically equivalent. In [13] heconsiders several
interacting firms in the same industry. In each period t each firm nadjusts its
output rate q (subject to an exogenous disturbance), andthen learns the common
market clearing price Pr based on which it adjusts the nextperiod's output rate.
Thus in [13] the interacting firms are Marshallian quantityadjusting firms,
somewhat similar to [17], unlike the price adjusting firms describedhere.
While we have given conditions which guarantee convergence to anequilib-
rium, the actual rate of convergence and the behavior of the price sequence
outside of equilibrium depends critically upon the adjustmentcoefficients y and
the magnitude of the disturbances. While estimates of theasymptotic behavior of
the random price sequence are available (see [1 1H13}), these estimatesprovide
no understanding of the "transient" behavior.Therefore we present below the
results of a numerical experiment of the scheme of Section 3.1 for atwo-firm case.














where and 13 are positive constants. The supply functions are taken as
= a"(p" +c"),6 n1, 2
with ce", c" as positive constants. Equation (3.1)now reads
(4.1) = {p'+ y(D' (pr) +- S"(p'))]'3, n =1, 2
Nine sample paths of (4.1) are presented correspondingto three different
values of {y,} and three different values of the noiseparameter a, as shown in
Table 4.1 below. In Figures 2a, b,c, y,0.012, a constant. Since y is large, initial
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converge to zero. In Figures 3a, h, c we obtain convergence. in Figures 4a, b, c
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10 15evident from these Figures that increased values ofa leads to poorer convergence
behavior. Ljung fill has shown that asymptotically the behaviorof the random
sequence (4.1) is similar to the behavior of the trajectories of the differential
equations
(4.2) jY'=D"(p)S(p)n=1,2
and, for purposes of comparison,one trajectory of (4.2) is plotted in Figure 1.
Electronics Systems Laboratory, MIT
Electronics Research Laboratory,
University of California, Berkeley
APPENDIX
A.1. Proof of L2.1
Since the proofs of (i)and(ii) are identical, we onlyprove (i). Let E=
'(v,+i)Z'(v), z(v, 1i)Z'(v). Then, by (2.3),
and it must be shown that a.s. For tn=1.....M define the random
sequence {e" by
eif t=m modulo M e'=1
(0 otherwise.
Then Eer=0 and er', e"are independent for because of (2.4). By (2.6)
ô' and we have (2.7),, y'<co. It follows from Theorem 4.3 of [11]
(where condition (2.5) is used)that the randomsequence i"-* 0 a.s. where =+(e- But since er=e" we have i=,7',so thati,-+0 a.s.
A.2. Proof of T.3





Now suppose"="(p)p so that
,i -n N n IT (p,.. .,p ,.. . ,p )>ir (p).
It is then a consequence of(3.13) and the definition(3.16) of 3" that
according as" _pfl
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aHence there is a sign-preserving function R' (which depends on p) such that
H(15 ")
and the stability of (A.1) follows.
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